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Joint Program Development Office (JPDO)Concepts of Operations for the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen) considers 4 Dimension Trajectory (4DT) procedures a key 
enabler to Trajectory Based Operations (TBO). The JPDO defines 4DT as “a precise description 
of an aircraft path in space and time”. While NextGen assumes that this path is defined within an 
Earth-reference frame, many 4DT procedure implementations will require an aircraft to precisely 
navigate relative to a moving reference such as another aircraft to form aggregate flows or a 
weather cell to allow for flows to shift. Current  methods of implementing routes and flight paths 
rely on aircraft meeting a Required Navigation Performance (RNP) specification and being 
equipped with a monitoring and alerting capability to annunciate when the aircraft system is 
unable to meet the performance specification required for the operation. Since all aircraft today 
operate within the NAS relative to fixed reference points, the current RNP definition is deemed 
satisfactory. However, it is not well understood how the current RNP construct will support 
NextGen 4DT procedures where aircraft operate relative to each other or to other dynamic 
frames of reference. The objective of this research effort is to analyze candidate 4DT procedures 
from both an Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) and aircraft perspective, to identify their 
specific navigational requirements, assess the shortcomings of the current RNP construct to meet 
these requirements, to propose an extended 4 Dimensional Dynamic RNP (4D Dynamic RNP) 
construct that accounts for the dynamic spatial and temporal nature of the selected 4DT 
procedures, and finally, to design an experiment using the Airspace and Traffic Operations 
Simulation (ATOS) system to validate the 4D Dynamic RNP construct. 
 
This Annual Interim Report summarizes the activities led by Raytheon, in collaboration with GE 
Aviation and SAIC, and presents the results obtained during the first year of this research effort 
to expand the RNP concept to 4 dimensions relative to a dynamic frame of reference.  A 
comprehensive assessment of the state-of-the-art international implementation of current RNP 
was completed and presented in the Contractor Report “RNP State-of-the-Art Assessment, 
Version 4, 17 December 2008”.  The team defined in detail two 4DT operations, Airborne 
Precision Spacing and Self-Separation, that are ideally suited to be supported by 4D Dynamic 
RNP and developed their respective conceptual frameworks, “Required Interval Management 
Performance (RIMP) Version 1.1, 13 April 2009” and “Required Self Separation Performance 
(RSSP) Version 1.1, 13 April 2009”.  Finally, the team started the development of  a 
mathematical model and simulation tool for RIMP and RSSP scheduled to be delivered during 
the second year of this research effort. 
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2 Technical Approach 
The Raytheon team brings a broad and comprehensive perspective on RNP and Trajectory Based 
Operations including operational support to the FAA for the implementation of Area Navigation 
(RNAV) and RNP, implementation of advanced 4D capable avionics for airframe manufacturers 
and operational support to operators, modeling and simulation development of advanced CNS 
capabilities into ATOS, and support of various experiments for the NextGen Airspace Project.  
While our technical approach attempts to use and build upon the content and document structure 
of the Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS, DO-236B) and Minimum 
Operational Performance Specifications (MOPS, DO-283A) developed by RTCA, we have 
leveraged the team’s breadth of perspective and expertise to determine the practicability of 
extending this construct to 4D RNP relative to a dynamic frame of reference. 
 
For Year 1 of this research effort, the key elements of our technical approach were: 
1. Assessment of international state-of-the-art in 2D, 3D and 4D RNP capability and use of 
RNP procedures and performance levels 
2. Selection of candidate NextGen procedures and applications, and definition of the 
relevant 4D Dynamic RNP requirements  
3. Develop a mathematical construct and implement a model for 4D Dynamic RNP in 
support of the selected procedures 
 
3 RNP State-of-the-Art Assessment 
The “RNP State-of-the-Art Assessment, v4, 17 December 2008” retraces the concept of 
Performance Based Navigation (PBN) from its origin in the early nineties and the development 
of satellite based technologies to the latest implementations throughout the world.  The report 
documents the conceptual and operational perspectives of  lateral, vertical, and time Required 
Navigation Performance.  It also provides a directory of the documents related to 
PBN/RNAV/RNP, the RNAV and RNP Procedures and a status of international RNP 
implementation. 
 
4 4D Dynamic RNP Overview 
4.1 Introduction 
RTCA document DO 236B contains MASPS for RNAV systems operating in an RNP 
environment.  This report will start with DO-236B requirements and apply them to developing 
performance requirements for aircraft self-separation and self-spacing applications.   
 
The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) is envisioned as a revolutionary 
transformation of the U.S. airspace to a performance-based, scalable, network enabled system 
that will be flexible enough to meet future air traffic needs.  One of the major transformations is 
the use of TBO as the main mechanism for managing traffic at high density or in highly-complex 
airspace.  These TBOs will be specified between the user and the air navigation service provider 
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(ANSP) and agreed in a “contract”, using advanced automation. Overall, preferences for all users 
are accommodated to the greatest extent possible, and trajectories constrained only to the extent 
required to accommodate congestion, or for security, safety or environmental reasons.   Changes 
to that “contract” will be made collaboratively, balancing the user preferences with the ANSP 
constraints.   
 
A major element of TBO is trajectory-based separation management (SM), which uses 
automation and shared trajectories to better manage separation among aircraft and airspace and 
hazards such as weather and terrain.  TBO provides a means for maintaining a target level of 
safety (TLS) while increasing traffic densities well beyond what is possible today given the 




5 Required Self Separation Performance 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This section examines what would be required in order to ensure a TLS for a scenario, in which 
aircraft have primary responsibility for providing separation from other aircraft in contrast to the 
current system where that responsibility lies with the ground-based ANSP.  It describes the 
system components, identifies key system parameters, and derives an RNP-like construct for 
self-separation operations. 
 
5.1.1 Separation Background 
Separation is the term used to describe the act of keeping aircraft at such distances from each 
other that the risk of their colliding with each other is below a TLS.  Such separation distances 
are specified as horizontal or vertical standards.  Separation in the horizontal plane can be 
applied either longitudinally, spacing aircraft behind each other; laterally, spacing aircraft side by 
side; or a composite of the two, providing separation for aircraft whose paths cross.  When not 
horizontally separated, vertical separation is achieved by aircraft operating at different altitudes 
(flight levels).  The required separation is usually expressed in terms of minimum distances in 
each dimension, which should not be infringed.  In the case of horizontal separation, the 
minimum distance can be expressed in either nautical miles, degrees of angular displacement 
(e.g.: on departure) or, in the longitudinal dimension, as either time-based or distance-based 
minima.   
 
The separation minima used by Air Traffic Services (ATS) today in radar-controlled airspace 
takes into account that any decisions are based on a picture of the airspace derived from radar 
surveillance.  The separation minima used must therefore ensure that even in the worst case 
surveillance conditions the positive separation of aircraft can be maintained.  The 
implementation of Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS) and digital data link 
communications technologies into the NAS will provide significant improvements beyond 
current  procedural ground-based control.   This is due to the increased frequency and accuracy 
of position updates as well as information on the future intent of the aircraft.  The technology 
should enable significant reductions in separation and spacing minima.   
5.1.2 Enabling Technologies: RNP and ADS-B 
Figure 1-1, “Navigation System Block Diagram”, from DO-236B provides a general description 
of the functions and describes the relationship between the various elements of the navigation 
system.   One of the elements critical to precision separation is the path definition function since 
it computes the defined path to be flown in relation to the vertical, horizontal, and time 
dimensions.  The RNP concept provides the means for quantifying lateral containment integrity 




Unfortunately, DO-236B only discusses, in detail, lateral path definition whereas NextGen 
envisions TBOs based on full 4DTs.  Two dimensional trajectory (2DT) operations are defined 
by longitudinal and lateral positions and define a ground track.   Three dimensional trajectories 
(3DT) add the vertical position so that altitude is defined anywhere along the ground track.   4DT 
adds the time element to trajectory-based operations.   
 
Full 4D TBO will require updated equipment standards and aircraft capabilities:  
a. Navigation and Guidance - more precise definition of vertical profiles and better 
definition and precision for along track/time-control,  
b. Communication – ability to describe trajectory windows and performance in all 
dimensions and to access available data and negotiate trajectories,  
c. Surveillance – ability to conduct relative navigation (spacing) or accept delegated 
separation, and finally  
d. Flight Crew Displays and Decision Support – flight crew awareness and 
management of TBO. 
 
This report assumes the use of a surveillance technology with the full capabilities defined for 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) systems defined in DO-242A to 
provide aircraft with position, velocity, and identification data about the aircraft operating in 
their vicinity, and in some instances, more complete intent information than is currently defined 
in the published ADS-B standards.  
5.2 System Overview 
A key new technology required to support self-separation is an Airborne Separation Assistance 
System (ASAS).  This system is needed to monitor the state and intent of the ownship aircraft in 
the context of the state and intent of reference aircraft as determined by the onboard surveillance 
function.  The ASAS is expected to not only alert the flight crew to predicted losses of separation 
(conflicts), but also to supply one or more maneuvers that, if implemented, should resolve such 
conflict(s).  The relationship of the ASAS to other aircraft systems is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Separation System Functional Block Diagram 
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5.2.1 ADS-B Transceiver 
The ADS-B transceiver transmits and receives ADS-B signals.  It collects outgoing data from the 
position estimation and navigation functions.  Received ADS-B messages are passed to the 
Surveillance function for processing. 
5.2.2 Surveillance 
The Surveillance function assembles ADS-B messages and maintains target and track 
information for each aircraft within ADS-B range.  The Surveillance function is responsible for 
track initiation and maintenance and ensures that a consistent set of intent data for cooperating 
targets is available for the other aircraft functions. 
5.2.3 State Estimation 
The state estimation function maintains the estimate of the aircraft’s position, velocity, and the 
current time.  It provides estimates of the quality of the position and velocity data.  This function 
also includes the real-time estimation of the local wind vector based on the difference between 
ground-referenced velocity and air-referenced velocity. 
5.2.4 Navigation 
The navigation function generates the expected 4D trajectory of the ownship aircraft (ownship 
intent).  This trajectory is updated in accordance with changes generated by the pilot or when the 
aircraft state deviates from the trajectory in dimensions that are not being controlled (e.g. time 
drift when there is not RTA constraint).  The navigation function also provides the guidance 
signals to the flight control system and to the flight crew. 
5.2.5 ASAS 
The ASAS function compares the aircraft state and trajectory to the estimated state and trajectory 
of reference aircraft to monitor predicted separation, detect potential conflicts, and provide 
conflict resolution guidance in order to ensure that safe separation will be maintained.  The 
estimated trajectory of reference aircraft is based either on broadcast intent information (Class A 
systems) or projection of state information in the absence of reference intent.  When a loss of 
separation is projected within a specified time horizon, the ASAS function presents an indication 
to the flight crew and computes one or more resolution maneuvers for pilot selection and 
execution. 
5.2.6 Display and System Alerting 
This function encompasses the interfaces between the aircraft systems and the flight crew. 
5.3 Required Self-Separation Performance 
Analogous to the different performance levels used to define RNP capabilities and airspace user 
requirements, a suitable performance characterization, Required Self-Separation Performance 
(RSSP), is needed for ASAS equipped aircraft.  The expectation is that an RSSP performance 
level will define a sufficient set of system performance attributes to permit determination of the 
separation buffer required to attain a specified TLS.  Unlike RNP, the RSSP will need to be 
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based on a multi-dimensional set of metrics in order to encompass the main interdependent 
parameters that affect achieving the target level of safety1 (TLS) for a given traffic 
density/complexity (or, conversely, the traffic density/complexity for which a given TLS can be 
sustained) 2.  These interdependent parameters include: 
a) Aircraft navigation and guidance performance (4D RNP); 
b) Surveillance performance (range, accuracy, update rate/latency, update reliability, level 
of intent detail, and level of intent accuracy which has not yet been defined);  
c) Conflict resolution algorithm capabilities (how boxed in does the ownship need to get 
before no resolution can be found); and 
d) Look ahead time horizon (how far ahead are conflicts typically detected and resolution 
maneuvers reflected in intent broadcasts). 
The expectation is that controlling these parameters will permit progressively reducing 
separation standards by reducing uncertainty and unpredictability in the overall system, thereby 
permitting higher-performing aircraft to operate in higher density airspace.  These parameters are 
interdependent in that an increase or decrease in any single parameter may result in a 
corresponding increase or decrease in some or all of the others.  RSSP is a consolidation of RNP, 
Required Communications Performance (RCP) of the surveillance datalink, and Required 
Surveillance Performance (RSP)3.  RSSP is effectively a Communications, Navigation, and 
Surveillance (CNS)/ATM matrix where the outcome is directly related to a level of capability 
that is required to operate in a particular airspace.   
5.3.1 Separation System Categories 
This document recognizes two distinct classes of self-separation system.  Class B systems use 
only position and velocity surveillance data (state data) from the reference aircraft in order to 
detect conflicts and determine separation maneuvers.  Class A systems use not only the state data 
of class B systems, but also provide and receive intent data as part of the surveillance data 
exchange.  Having this intent data greatly reduces the errors and uncertainties associated with 
linearly projecting state data into the future and permits Class A systems to make more accurate 
predictions further into the future than Class B systems and to account for planned maneuvers of 
other aircraft.  The two classes are distinguished because the presence or absence of intent data 
has a significant impact on the analysis of separation errors. 
                                                 
1 TLS = the requisite Target Level of Safety for the airspace domain, e.g. Where, “fatal accidents per flight hour” is 
considered to be an appropriate metric, a TLS of 5x10-9 fatal accidents per flight hour per dimension for the en-
route domain.   NOTE:  Where fatal accidents per flight hour is not considered to be an appropriate metric, 
justifiable alternative metrics and methods of assessment providing an acceptable TLS may be established.  United 
States TERPS criteria provide an example for obstacle clearance at 10-7 per approach or 10-9 instantaneous collision 
from an obstacle. 
2 The numeric determination of a level of safety will depend upon the traffic density/complexity because the traffic 
density/complexity is a primary driver of conflict probability and the likelihood of finding conflict-free airspace to 
use for a conflict resolution. 
3 Definitions and standards for RCP and RSP are in development.  The concepts of RCP and RSP have been 
discussed at ICAO.  The FAA Associate Administrator for Safety talked about RCP, RSP and Required Total System 




5.3.2 RSSP Concept 
The accuracy, integrity, and continuity concepts for longitudinal/time performance (and vertical 
performance) has not been addressed by ICAO or FAA to the level of detail that RNP (lateral) 
has, and the MASPS address accuracy requirements of Estimated Time of arrival (ETA), Time of 
Arrival Control (TOAC), and Vertical Navigation (VNAV) only at a very high level.  Currently, 
the standards only address performance relative to a fixed, earth-referenced path and do not in 
any way address performance measurement in a dynamic frame of reference, such as flight 
relative to another aircraft.  Because of the need to be able to quantify a level of safety associated 
with self-separation operations, this document develops a proposed RSSP concept and associated 
requirements. 
 
For consistency with the ICAO definition of RNP, the document defines RSSP as: A statement 
of the self-separation performance accuracy, integrity, continuity, and availability necessary for 
conducting self-separation operations within self-separation permissible airspace4. 
5.3.3 Application of RSSP 
The term RSSP is applied as a descriptor for airspace where self-separation is permitted.  This 
could encompass a large area, such as one or more en route or oceanic sectors, or to a more 
constrained volume such as a flow corridor as defined in the NextGen Concept of Operations 
(ConOps). 
5.3.4 RSSP Types 
The term RSSP -x-y is introduced to denote both an area of self-separation permitted airspace 
and, simultaneously, the minimum aircraft system performance required to perform self-
separation within that airspace. 
 
The ‘x’ indicates the class of RSSP system.  Currently, two classes are defined: 
 Class A systems provide and use both state and detailed intent information. 
 Class B systems need only provide and use state information. 
 
The ‘y’ indicates the category of required system performance.  Each such category is associated 
with performance metrics that, taken together, define an aircraft’s ability to identify and resolve 
conflicts to a particular standard.  The set of metrics is enumerated in Section 5.4.4. The 
definition of the specific categories and the metric thresholds associated with them, however, is 
beyond the scope of this document. 
 
5.4 Operational Goals and Applications 
Under a performance-based system, as envisioned by NextGen, excess separation resulting from 
today’s control imprecision (a product of available data and controller workload) and lack of 
                                                 
4 While self-separation is only expected to take place in RSSP designated airspace, this statement does not imply 
that such airspace may not also contain aircraft for whom separation assurance is being provided for by the ANSP.  
This report does not address such ‘mixed’ operations or the related equipage requirements for non-RSSP aircraft 
that would result if RSSP aircraft are required to maintain separation from the non-RSSP aircraft. 
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predictability are minimized which enables reduced separation among aircraft.  Also, separation 
management responsibility may be delegated or transferred to aircraft having the capability to 
perform that function.  Self separating aircraft, as envisioned by NextGen, are required to 
maintain separation from all other aircraft, and obstacles and hazards, in the airspace.  Aircraft 
follow the proper separation procedures and avoid any maneuvers that generate immediate 
conflicts with any other aircraft.  Self separation procedures are conducted only in self separation 
airspace.  Eventually, self separating aircraft will have 4 dimensional trajectories (4DT). Either 
the separation maneuver will leave the aircraft within the constraints of its 4DT, or the flight 
crew will need to negotiate a new 4DT.  This document does not attempt to define a complete 
concept of operations for self-separation, and in particular, does not address issues such as the 
unambiguous handoff of separation responsibility when transitioning into and out of self-
separation airspace. 
5.4.1 Overview 
The self-separation scenario looks at the situation when one aircraft (ownship) must pass no 
closer than a specified separation distance (or more generally, an exclusion zone)5 from another 
aircraft (reference)6.  In order to perform this maneuver reliably, ownship must target a 
separation that includes some extra buffer in addition to the required separation to account for 
uncertainties in ownship and reference aircraft state estimation and performance.  Because this 
additional buffer represents inefficiency in the operation (use of airspace, excess ownship 
maneuvering, etc.), it is desirable to keep it to the practical minimum.  The necessary size of this 
additional buffer, however, is a complex function of the uncertainties inherent in the 
measurement of the ownship and reference aircraft state, knowledge of reference aircraft intent 
(future maneuvers before reaching the point of closest approach), crossing geometry, and 
predictions of future aircraft positions based on current measurements.  The necessary buffer size 
is also a function of the ownship ability to execute the required maneuvers accurately and in a 
timely fashion.  The goal of this analysis is to be able to specify a mathematical construct, 
analogous to RNP in the cross-track direction, that can be used for determining the size of buffer 
required to produce a given level of assurance that ownship will not pass within the exclusion 
zone of reference (or cause reference to pass through ownship’s exclusion zone) in the lateral 
and/or vertical dimensions7, though for the purposes of this analysis, the focus will be on lateral 
separation. 
5.4.2 Concept of Operation 
The scenario assumes that at some point in time T0, ownship determines (via ATC instruction, 
automation, or pilot) that it must maneuver to miss reference (i.e. be outside of the exclusion 
zone at the point of closest approach (PCA) to the boundary of the exclusion zone) by at least a 
                                                 
5 This separation distance or exclusion zone must at a minimum account for the physical extent of each aircraft 
plus the wake vortex avoidance area behind each (not only must ownship not pass through reference’s wake 
before it has decayed sufficiently, ownship must also not make reference pass through ownship’s wake).  If 
mitigation strategies are relied upon to account for excess uncertainty, mitigation will add to the separation 
distance. 
6 Or, in the general case, a non-stationary constraint such as a convective weather cell. 
7 This level of assurance is an element, along with alerting and mitigation strategies, of the analysis required to 
demonstrate a TLS. 
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specified distance, Figure 2.8  The determination of which aircraft must maneuver is expected to 
be based on a set of rules, analogous to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions 
at Sea and applied without the need for explicit coordination between aircraft. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Original Estimated Geometry 
 
At T0, ownship has an estimate of the position and velocity of both ownship and reference.  
Ownship may also have an estimate of the future trajectory of ownship and reference (intent 
information).  In the horizontal plane, the maneuver could consist of a change of speed, as shown 
in Figure 3, or direction, as shown in Figure 4.  Of course, a combination of these, or a change of 
altitude are also possible resolution maneuvers. 
 
                                                 
8 While many of the errors and uncertainties considered in this analysis pertain to the accuracy of this 
determination, the focus will be on the post-maneuver portion of the case in order to include the contribution of 
maneuver uncertainty to the total. 
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Figure 3 - Estimated Geometry after Ownship Slows 
 
 
Figure 4 - Estimated Geometry after Ownship Turns 
 
The scenario assumes that ownship has measurements of relevant state parameters and their 
accuracy and integrity from the onboard navigation system.  It also assumes that ownship has 
some measurement of reference’s state parameters and their accuracy and integrity via ADS-B 
transmissions from reference received by ownship’s ADS-B receiver.  For Class A systems, the 
scenario also assumes that some level of reference aircraft intent information is available, for 
example by ADS-B transmission of one or more Trajectory Change Points (TCPs), but the extent 
of that information will be kept as a parameter in the mathematical construct.  The extent to 
which reference is permitted to maneuver without broadcasting intent adds directly to the 
uncertainty of the predicted separation and is outside the scope of this document.  The analysis 
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will also assume that ownship has measurements of wind and other relevant atmospheric 
parameters as well as knowledge of the accuracy and integrity of those measurements. 
5.4.3 Procedure Description 
How responsibility for maintaining the minimum separation is transferred from ATC to ownship 
is immaterial to this analysis and will not be considered as part of the procedure.  It is sufficient 
to begin with the premise that ownship has this responsibility.  Furthermore, barring the 
introduction of new constraints, this procedure assumes that ownship will execute the 
maneuver(s) determined after T0 without further alteration to compensate for error accumulation, 
so the maneuver(s) must include an adequate separation buffer9. 
5.4.3.1 Timeline/Decomposition of Events 
T0 Ownship systems determine that a maneuver will be required to assure maintenance 
of the specified separation and inform the pilot. 
T1 Ownship automation determines one or more candidate maneuvers that will assure 
maintenance of the specified separation and present them to the pilot.10 
T2 Ownship pilot selects which maneuver candidate will be executed. 
T3 Ownship pilot configures onboard navigation system to perform the selected 
maneuver sequence. 
T4 Ownship ADS-B begins broadcasting new intent information (Class A systems). 
T5 Ownship executes planned maneuver(s). 
T6 Ownship passes Point of Closest Approach (PCA) to reference, which, if the buffer 
used was adequate, meets or exceeds the specified separation distance. 
5.4.3.2 Pilot Procedures 
The ownship pilot is assumed to have already accepted responsibility for maintaining separation 
from reference before the scenario begins.  Within the scenario, the pilot is responsible for: 
1. Selecting the preferred separation maneuver(s), 
2. Configuring the navigation system to perform the selected maneuver(s), 
3. Ensuring that ownship performs the selected maneuver(s), and 
4. Monitoring to ensure that the maneuver provides at least the specified separation (this 
monitoring is aided by the onboard tools). 
5.4.4 Errors and Uncertainties 
The construct for determining the required separation performance needs to account for: 
1. Accuracy and integrity of ownship state data. 
2. Accuracy of ownship planned trajectory (both current and planned maneuver), which 
depends on: 
                                                 
9 This assumption/constraint is introduced in recognition of the cockpit workload implications of a strategy that 
continuously updates the maneuver based on the evolving state of the two aircraft. 
10 We assume that the tools leave sufficient time before the assumed initiation of each maneuver candidate to 
allow pilot selection and implementation to take place before the initiation time. 
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a. Control method accuracy (manual vs. automatic guidance) 
b. Accuracy of modeling method (e.g. 6 DOF vs. kinematic) and modeling 
parameters (thrust, drag, etc). 
c. Accuracy of predicted wind and temperature data. 
d. Accuracy of earth model. 
e. Correspondence between planned/predicted maneuver and actual maneuver 
executed (time of execution, acceleration/deceleration magnitude and transition, 
roll-in/roll-out transitions, turn-rate/bank angle used).  This should directly 
correspond to 4D RNP performance level. 
3. Accuracy and integrity of reference state data. 
4. Accuracy and completeness of reference intent data (which depends on the same factors 
as the ownship data). 
5. Encounter geometry (e.g. crossing angle). 
6. ETE to point of closest approach in the resolution maneuver. 
7. Anticipated ownship FTE bounds near point of closest approach. 
The effects of these errors are represented in Figure 5.  Note that it is expected that the total 
uncertainty will increase the further into the future that the aircraft state is predicted.  For Class 
A systems, this increase will be capped by the 4D RNP accuracy and containment associated 
with the ownship trajectory and reference aircraft intent.  For Class B systems, this growth is a 
result of integrating velocity over time in order to make the predictions of future position.  In 
practice, this growth may be exponential for the prediction of the reference aircraft’s state 
because of the possibility of unannounced maneuvers by the reference aircraft.11  For the 
purposes of performance evaluation, however, any such maneuvering would be considered to 
create a new encounter situation. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Estimated Geometry with Uncertainties and Errors 
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The overall separation performance can be quantified by defining containment boundaries in the 
lateral and vertical dimension.  These boundaries correspond to the region within which the 
actual separation will fall 95% of the time.  They can also be used to define a further region that 
the actual separation will not exceed without alert with extremely high probability.  Unlike in the 
case of RNP-RNAV, however, definition of the containment boundaries is not, in itself, adequate 
to be able to quantify a TLS.  For RNP-RNAV, considerable freedom is left to the designer to 
make performance tradeoffs among the various system characteristics that contribute to overall 
lateral performance.  For RSSP, however, there is a need to place additional constraints on this 
trade-space because the separation performance depends on the combined performance 
characteristics of two independent vehicles.   
 
In order to ensure that any pair of vehicles conforming to a given RSSP performance level will 
yield the desired overall separation performance, additional vehicle error, uncertainty, and 
system characteristics must be constrained for a given RSSP performance level.  These errors, 
uncertainties, and system characteristics are captured using the following metrics which will be 
further defined in Section 5.7.1: 
a) 4D RNP performance level12; 
b) Accuracy, integrity and continuity of surveillance data from reference aircraft, including 
intent data if present; 
c) How quickly the aircraft can respond (the relative time between recognizing that a 
conflict requires a resolution maneuver and completion of that resolution maneuver); 
d) How long before closest point of approach conflict resolution maneuvers can be selected; 
e) How long before initiation of non-emergency maneuvers new intent information is 
broadcast; 
f) Surveillance system range at X% message reception probability and other surveillance 
datalink performance characteristics; and 
g) Degrees of freedom employed for resolution maneuvers (lateral, longitudinal, vertical, 
and combinations thereof); 
5.5 Assumptions 
This document makes several assumptions applicable to all classes of system, and the remainder 
applies to Class A systems only. 
5.5.1 Assumptions Applicable to All Classes 
5.5.1.1 Uniformity of Equipage 
Because the RSSP capability is expected to be applied to a volume of airspace, it is assumed that 
all aircraft operating in that airspace will at least meet the minimum RSSP standards required by 
the airspace. 
                                                 
12 The 4D RNP performance level defines the accuracy, integrity, and continuity performance of each aircraft in the 
lateral (RNP-RNAV), longitudinal/time (TOAC), and vertical (VNAV) dimensions. 
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5.5.1.2 Reference Aircraft State 
The RSSP concept assumes that all aircraft in the airspace continuously transmit and receive 
ADS-B data in compliance with RTCA DO-242A including the following parameters: 
 Target identity 
 Latitude and longitude 
 Pressure altitude 
 Position accuracy and integrity 
 North and east velocity 
 Vertical speed 
 Velocity accuracy and integrity 
 Time of applicability (reference time of the other state parameters) 
It is further assumed that ownship and reference are either using the same transmission format 
for ADS-B (e.g. 1090ES or UAT) or the airspace is served by an Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance – Rebroadcast (ADS-R) service that reliably echoes messages between the two 
transmission formats with negligible delay. 
5.5.1.3 Ownship State 
The ASAS function has access to at least the set of ownship state parameters for that is available 
via ADS-B for the reference aircraft. 
5.5.2 Assumptions Applicable to Class A Systems 
5.5.2.1 Reference Aircraft Intent 
The primary differentiator between Class A and Class B systems is the availability of intent 
information for the reference aircraft.  The intent information, which is not yet fully defined in 
the relevant ADS-B standards, will at least describe the intended motion of reference as a 
sequence of segments within which intermediate 4D states may be computed without significant 
accuracy degradation using the assumption of uniform (possibly zero) acceleration along the 
three primary aircraft axes.  This intent information should cover at least the minimum time 
horizon required by the applicable RSSP performance level for conflict detection.  The intent 
information will be updated whenever the reference aircraft’s current intent differs significantly 
relative to the accuracy requirements of the intent broadcast (which will in turn be specified 
either by the ADS-B standard or by the RSSP performance level).  For RSSP performance levels 
intended for use in dense and complex airspace, there is a requirement that the reference aircraft 
broadcast a change in intent at least a minimum notification time in advance of performing a 
maneuver13 that had not been included in prior intent broadcasts.  This requirement is needed to 
reduce the likelihood of simultaneous conflicting near-term maneuvers. 
5.5.2.2 Ownship Intent 
The RSSP concept assumes that a Class A system has access to detailed and accurate ownship 
intent information and associated accuracy metrics from the onboard Flight Management System 
                                                 
13 Obviously, this requirement would not apply to the non-normal case of a maneuver required for collision 
avoidance or other safety-related exigency. 
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(FMS) or equivalent.  Ownship is assumed to be operating at a specified 4D RNP level (a 
successor to the current standard that defines containment in the longitudinal/time and vertical 
dimensions in addition to the lateral dimension) such that guidance is provided to maintain 
conformance to broadcast intent in all dimensions.  Alternatively, ownship intent will be updated 
before significant deviations accumulate in the longitudinal/time or vertical dimensions. 
5.6 Definitions 
The definition of key terms used in this section is collected below for convenience.  Italics are 
used to denote terms in these definitions that may be found in this section. 
5.6.1 Required Self-Separation Performance 
 
SELF-SEPARATION  
The process by which one aircraft assumes responsibility for managing the distance between 
itself and one or more reference aircraft without direct involvement of the ANSP. 
 
REQUIRED SELF-SEPARATION PERFORMANCE (RSSP)    
A statement of the self-separation performance necessary for operation within a defined 
airspace. 
 
CLASS   
The type or category of RSSP compliant system. 
 
CLASS A   
An RSSP compliant system that uses intent information to provide more robust conflict detection 
and avoidance capabilities in airspace where aircraft can reasonably be expected to be 
maneuvering (e.g. terminal or high density airspace). 
 
CLASS B   
An RSSP compliant system that needs only position and velocity information to perform conflict 
detection and resolution. 
 
EXCLUSION ZONE 
The volume around an aircraft that no other aircraft may be permitted to transgress, either due to 
risk of physical contact or risk of significant wake vortex encounter.   
 
POINT OF CLOSEST APPROACH (PCA) 
The 3D position where the lateral distance of one aircraft to the other aircraft’s exclusion zone is 
at a minimum, or, in the vertical dimension, the 3D position where the vertical distance of one 
aircraft to the other aircraft is at a minimum while either aircraft is within the lateral extent of the 
other aircraft’s exclusion zone14.   
                                                 
14 The concept of exclusion zone is introduced to distinguish between pure metal-on-metal contact-based 






The required lateral (or vertical) distance, between Ownship and Reference Aircraft at the PCA. 
 
DEFINED SEPARATION 
The lateral (or vertical) distance, between Ownship and Reference Aircraft at the PCA that is 
input to the ASAS function.   
 
ACTUAL SEPARATION 
The true lateral (or vertical) distance, between Ownship and Reference Aircraft when they are at 
the true PCA. 
 
ESTIMATED SEPARATION 
The output of the separation computation function, equal to the computed lateral (or vertical) 
separation at the computed PCA.  This does not take into account potential future maneuvers that 





A position in space consisting of latitude, longitude, and altitude. 
 
TIME REFERENCE 
The reference time source for the trajectory; for example, Universal Coordinated Time (UTC). 
 
CURRENT TIME 
The present time according to the time reference. 
 
PREDICTED TRAJECTORY 
The predicted 3D position of an aircraft as a function of time. 
 
INTENT 
The representation of an aircraft’s predicted trajectory that is encoded in ADS-B messages. 
 
ESTIMATED TIME 
The time input to the trajectory prediction function, synchronized to the time reference. 
 
ESTIMATED 3D POSITION 
The 3D position input to the trajectory prediction function.  This position is determined by a 
Navigation function based on sensor inputs. 
 
ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL (ETA) 




TIME TO GO (TTG) 
The duration from the current time until the aircraft reaches a defined point, typically in this 
discussion, the PCA. 
 
TRAJECTORY CHANGE POINT (TCP) 
A discrete point on the predicted trajectory containing the latitude, longitude, altitude, time, and 
speed (either CAS or Mach).  This is a basic set of variables that may be standardized and/or 
expanded in the future. 
5.6.3 Error Terms 
 
SEPARATION ERROR   
The difference between the planned separation at the PCA when a clearance maneuver was 
formulated and the separation at the actual PCA.  The tails of the statistical distribution of this 
parameter are effectively bounded for each combination of RSSP class and performance level 
and conflict encounter geometry (crossing angle and speeds). 
 
LATERAL SEPARATION ERROR   
The separation error measured in the horizontal plane. 
 
SEPARATION DEFINITION ERROR (SDE) 
The difference between the desired separation and the defined separation, for example due to 
approximations used in the separation function to define the exclusion zone. 
 
ESTIMATED TIME ERROR (ETE) 
The difference between the current time and the estimated time, synchronized to the time 
reference. 
 
ESTIMATED POSITION ERROR (EPE) 
The difference between the true 3D position and the estimated 3D position of the aircraft. 
 
COMPUTED SEPARATION ERROR (CSE) 
The difference between the estimated separation and the defined separation. 
 
SEPARATION ESTIMATION ERROR (SEE) 
The error in the computation of estimated separation. 
 
SEPARATION CONTROL AUTHORITY (SCA) 
The ability of ownship to maneuver in order to compensate for computed separation error and 
separation estimation error. 
 
TOTAL SEPARATION ERROR (TSE) 
The difference between the actual separation and the desired separation.  It is equal to the sum 
of the separation definition error, computed separation error, and separation estimation error 
less the separation control authority.  The separation control authority is subtracted because it 
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represents a controllable portion of the error.  The uncontrollable portion of the error is 
analogous to the FTE in RNP. 
 
5.6.4 Separation Containment Concept 
The concept of separation containment is based on the concept of lateral (or cross-track) 
containment as defined in RTCA DO-236B, but the manner in which it is measured differs.  For 
RSSP, the “RNP value” used in RNP-RNAV is replaced with a pair of measures, Separation 
Boundary Lateral (SBL) and Separation Boundary Vertical (SBV).  This pair of measures 
defines limits, in the lateral and vertical dimensions respectively, around the desired separation 
within which the actual separation will fall for at least 95% of encounters requiring some form 
of resolution maneuver. 
 
Separation containment integrity requirements limit the probability of the Total Separation 
Error exceeding the SBL/SBV requirements with no annunciation at least some specified time T 
before reaching the PCA. 
 
Separation containment continuity requirements limit the probability of a loss of function.  In 
this context, function is defined as the ability to meet the separation containment requirement 
(i.e. to be within the desired SBL/SBV limits at and after time T). 
 
There are five possible system states relative to the SBL/SBV limits.  These states are: 
1) S1: TSE > SBL/SBV, TTG > T, no alert (Integrity) 
2) S2: TTG > T, alert    (Continuity) 
3) S3: TSE > SBL/SBV, TTG < T, no alert (Integrity) 
4) S4: TTG < T, alert    (Continuity) 
5) S5: TSE < SBL/SBV, no alert  (Normal Operations) 
 
Note: P(S1) + P(S2) + P(S3) + P(S4) + P(S5) = 1 where P(x) is the probability of the system 
being in State x. 
 
T is the minimum amount of time prior to reaching PCA that the alert must be made if the 
aircraft cannot achieve the desired separation. 
 
States 1 and 3 represent the set of events associated with a loss of separation performance with 
no annunciation (alert), and are thus the integrity requirements.  The uncertainties associated 
with separation predictions generally increase with time or distance from the current position 
(primarily due to forecast wind uncertainties).  Thus, the probability of State 1 will be greater 
than the probability of State 3 (P(S1) >> P(S3)) due to TTG being > T.  However, it also needs to 
be considered that the control authority that ownship has to correct for these uncertainties will 
also generally decrease as the aircraft approaches the PCA.  This needs to be considered when 
determining a prior time T beyond which it is critical that an annunciation be received.  Thus, the 
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probability of S1 must be less than XX15 per flight hour, while the probability of S3 must be less 
than YY per operation. 
 
The continuity requirement applies to states S2 and S4 where the loss of function is detected 
and annunciated.  When current time is still far before T, the available control authority will be 
larger, and thus the probability of state S2 must be less than WW per flight hour.  When the 
aircraft is close to time T the control authority is greatly reduced, and thus the probability of S4 
must be less than ZZ per flight hour.  S5 represents the normal operation where the error is less 
than the SBL/SBV. 
 
In addition to the containment requirements, there is an uncertainty parameter associated with 
the predicted separation.  This uncertainty must be bounded to ensure appropriate control 
authority is available. 
 
CONTAINMENT 
A set of interrelated parameters used to define the performance of a separation control system.  
These parameters are containment integrity and containment continuity. 
 
CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 
A measure of confidence in the estimate, expressed as the probability that the system will detect 
and annunciate the condition where the TSE is greater than the SBL/SBV limit and the condition 
has not been detected.   
 
CONTAINMENT CONTINUITY 
The capability of the total system to satisfy the performance limit without nonscheduled 
interruptions during the intended operation.  Nonscheduled interruption is defined to be either 1) 
total loss of  time prediction capability; 2) a failure of the system which is annunciated as a loss 
of time performance capability; or 3) a false annunciation of loss of time performance capability. 
 
CONTAINMENT REGION 
A region in both the along-track and cross-track dimensions, centered on the desired along track 
position on the desired path at a desired time T, to which the containment integrity and 
containment continuity are referenced.   
 
SEPARATION BOUNDARY LATERAL (SBL) 
The limit in the lateral dimension around the desired separation within which the actual 
separation will fall for at least 95% of encounters requiring some form of resolution maneuver. 
 
SEPARATION BOUNDARY VERTICAL (SBV) 
The limit in the vertical dimension around the desired separation within which the actual 
separation will fall for at least 95% of encounters requiring some form of resolution maneuver. 
 
                                                 
15 This and the following probability parameters will need to be determined based on a TLS and any mitigations 
that are identified as part of the procedures defined by the ANSP.  In practice, they will likely be tailored to specific 
RSSP performance categories. 
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5.7 System Performance Requirements 
5.7.1 Accuracy 
Accuracy is a measure of the difference between an aircraft‘s intended separation from a 
reference aircraft at the PCA (relative to the exclusion zone boundary) and the true separation at 
the true PCA.  It is given by a value associated with a confidence interval.  For example; within 
airspace requiring a particular RSSP performance level, the separation error will not be greater 
than 0.5 nautical miles for 95% of the conflicts requiring a resolution maneuver. 
5.7.2 State Data Accuracy Metrics 
5.7.2.1 The first two metrics deal with the accuracy of navigation data 
available to ownship and of the surveillance data provided by reference 
(and by inference, provided by ownship).  Ownship Navigation Accuracy 
If ownship is operating according to 4D RNP standards, then those standards define the lateral 
and longitudinal accuracy and containment parameters for ownship state estimation both at the 
present position and along ownship’s 4D trajectory.  This is the expected norm for Class A 
systems.  For Class B systems, it will be necessary to break this metric into individual lateral 
position, longitudinal position, and velocity sub-metrics in order to specify the ownship 
navigation accuracy. 
5.7.2.2 Reference Surveillance Accuracy 
The position and velocity accuracy and integrity for the reference accuracy are reported in ADS-
B messages as the navigation accuracy for position and velocity plus the surveillance integrity 
level.  When intent data is broadcast, it will need similar reported metrics.  For a given RSSP 
performance level, a set of minimum acceptable values for each of these quality metrics will 
constitute the reference surveillance accuracy metric. 
5.7.3 Additional Metrics 
In order to characterize the ability of an aircraft to perform self-separation, especially in more 
congested airspace, additional metrics also need to be specified. 
5.7.3.1 Response Time 
This metric measures how quickly the aircraft can respond to the need to resolve a conflict.  This 
applies whether the time to go to an anticipated conflict has just reached a threshold value or the 
reference aircraft has either maneuvered or broadcast new intent.  It is measured as the relative 
time between recognizing that a conflict requires a resolution maneuver and completion of that 
resolution maneuver. 
5.7.3.2 Look Ahead 
Look ahead measures how long before the closest point of approach a conflict resolution 
maneuvers can be selected.  It is primarily dictated by the accuracy of separation prediction as a 
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function of time to go to PCA and the characteristics of the surveillance datalink (reception 
probability versus range). 
5.7.3.3 Intended Maneuver Anticipation Time 
For Class A systems, it is expected that the ASAS function will plan the resolution maneuver to 
commence some time in the future in order to provide notice of the change in intent to 
neighboring aircraft before the maneuver begins. This metric captures the amount of time before 
the initiation of non-emergency maneuvers that new intent information is broadcast.   
5.7.3.4 Surveillance Datalink Performance 
In order to function effectively, the ASAS function needs to have surveillance data at a range 
that exceeds its required look ahead time.  Given assumptions of maximum closing speeds 
expected in a particular class of airspace, this can be translated into a surveillance range 
requirement defined as the range at which there is at least an X% (X >= 95) probability of 
receiving each transmission from reference. 
5.7.3.5 Resolution Flexibility 
Lower performance category ASAS systems might only provide simple lateral maneuvers, such 
as turns or sidesteps, to resolve conflicts.  Higher performance systems would take advantage of 
lateral, vertical, and speed controls to find resolutions.  The highest performing systems might be 
able to plan complex combinations of the three and be able to find resolution paths in the 
presence of multiple potentially conflicting aircraft.  This metric seeks to enumerate or quantify 
these differing performance levels.  Looked at another way, this metric captures the robustness 
with which the ASAS can find a path through multiple constraints. 
5.8 Integrity 
Integrity is a measure of the probability that information provided by a system will not be 
hazardously misleading. It is generally expressed as a probability of occurrence per operating 
hour, which expresses likelihood that a system will send the user bad/incorrect information that 
could cause a potentially dangerous situation without a timely warning.  For example the 
likelihood that the separation error exceeds a maximum of 1.0 nautical miles, without having 
alerted the flight crew at least 90 seconds in advance of the exceedance, shall be less than 10-5 
per flight hour. 
5.9 Continuity 
Continuity is the capability of a total system to perform its intended function without a non-
scheduled interruption during the intended operation assuming the system was available when 
the procedure was initiated.  Continuity is expressed per unit of time.  For example; the 
calculations of a single thread transponder mean time to failure of 5,000 hours. 
5.10 Availability 
Availability is the probability that a system will perform its required function at the initiation of 
the intended operation.  For example, the FAA target for availability of the Wide Area 
Augmentation System is 0.999. 
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6 Required Interval Management Performance 
6.1 Introduction 
Airborne Precision Spacing (APS) has been developed by NASA as an element of pair-wise 
interval management to improve the merging and spacing performance during approach and 
landing for high-density operations.  APS provides speed control guidance to the flight crew with 
an assigned spacing interval in the time domain at the runway threshold or a common waypoint 
with respect to a paired leading airplane (reference aircraft).  Speed control guidance is derived 
from both the reference aircraft and ownship’s flight profiles, current states of the reference 
aircraft and the ownship, and speed and altitude constraints at intermediate points along the 
approach routes.  The projected benefits of APS include providing the flight crew and air traffic 
controllers an automated speed control tool and advisories in delivering airplanes at the runway 
threshold at precise time intervals.  This precise performance can optimize the flow of traffic 
approaching the runway, and may increase the runway throughput [1].  The concept of APS is 
also in full conformance with two key NextGen environment components as defined by Joint 
Planning and Development Office (JPDO) [2], which are Performance-Based Operations and 
Services and Aircraft Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO).  The extension of Required 
Navigation Performance (RNP) in the time domain based on APS is a natural step towards the 
objectives of the NextGen air traffic environment.  The Required Interval Management 
Performance (RIMP) will provide a means to assure the interval management accuracy, 
availability, continuity, and integrity during terminal and approach phases of flight.  This can 
lead to a time-based interval management concept of operations.  One of the benefits of a time-
based RIMP is to allow enroute and terminal air traffic controllers to manage the spacing via 
time in seconds instead of closely monitoring merging traffic’s speed and distance for 
maintaining safe separation and compressing the traffic flow from en-route minima [3].  With the 
combination of APS and RIMP (APS-RIMP), workload of Air Navigation Service Provider 
(ANSP) controller can be potentially reduced.  RIMP compliant airplanes will also ensure the 
performance and accuracy in delivering airplanes at managed spacing intervals.  This document 
will present the concept of applying RIMP in APS, describe the system components, identify key 
system parameters, and discuss the derivation of RIMP requirements, procedures, assumptions, 
and RIMP dependency of uncertainties in airplane’s flying performance and equipment 
performance. 
6.2 System Overview 
The air traffic operations outlined in this document provide an APS-RIMP concept for aircraft 
converging to a common destination such as a runway or an intermediate navigation fix.  APS is 
a potential speed advisory element of future high-density arrival and departure operations 
envisioned in the NextGen air traffic system.  The focus of this APS-RIMP concept is the 
terminal and final approach portions of the flight.  The precision spacing is accomplished by 
sequencing the arriving aircraft early in the initial descent phase.  Each aircraft is assigned a 
reference aircraft to follow as shown in Figure 6.  The paired aircraft may share a portion of the 
final assigned route, but this is not required.  To achieve significant arrival density increase, this 
concept relies on precise spatial and temporal navigation that must be achieved for safe flight 
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operation.  This is accomplished by extending the RNP methodology to include an interval 
management time performance with associated uncertainty in seconds.  Similar to the lateral 
RNP rating, an interval management time rating will define a maximum uncertainty and a 
containment time which is defined in section 1.4.4 of this document.   
 
All aircraft engaged in this APS operation must meet a certain level of RIMP.  Different levels of 
RIMP are described in section 1.4.4 of this document.  This applies to both the reference aircraft 
and the ownship.  This concept applies to sequences of paired aircraft where the ownship itself 
becomes the reference aircraft for the subsequent following aircraft.  
 
 
Figure 6 - Overview of APS-RIMP Operation 
 
The APS-RIMP precision spacing concept outlined here uses many aspects of the NextGen 
technology to perform the required navigation and guidance.  This includes integrated 
surveillance capabilities provided by Automated Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B), 
Traffic Information Service – Broadcast (TIS-B), Flight information Service – Broadcast (FIS-B) 
and associated ground radars, and precision navigation and timing provided through Global 
Navigation Surveillance System (GNSS).  It also relies on digital data link communication with 
the ANSP facilities and personnel.  The techniques used to accomplish the precision spacing 
include automatic 4 Dimension (4D) trajectory generation to the desired destination or 
navigation fix, real-time adjustments to the prescribed velocity profile to maintain the desired 
separation, and 4D navigation performance monitoring to ensure the RNP and RIMP for the 














An integrated navigation system as addressed here includes one or more navigation sensors (such 
as Inertial Navigation System (INS)/Global Positioning System (GPS)), one or more air data 
sensors, and other relevant aircraft sensors (such as angle of attack, propulsion system sensors, 
etc.) to assess overall system performance, surveillance sensors (such as ADS-B), digital data 
link with the air traffic control authority (ANSP) and extensive processing capability to define 
4D trajectories and perform the required 4D guidance (Figure 7).  The navigation and guidance 
algorithms developed in support of this concept perform position estimation, path definition, path 
steering, and calculation of Time-To-Go (TTG) to the destination (navigation fix or runway 
threshold) for the aircraft as well as for the lead aircraft to which the ownship has been paired to 
follow. 
 
The APS system will provide a precise adjustment to the nominal speed command to achieve the 
spacing constraint, and provide the flight crew with situation indications and alert them if the 
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Figure 7 - APS System Block Diagram 
 
6.2.1  State Estimation 
Position estimation requirements are outlined in RTCA DO-236B (section 1.2.1) [3].  
Additionally, APS-RIMP operation will require timing, surveillance, wind and air temperature 
information.  Precise time measurement using a common time reference and an accurate estimate 
of time uncertainty associated with that measurement are needed to arrive at the ownship time-
to-go estimates.  The current position and speed of reference aircraft and its intended 4D 
trajectory are needed for the reference aircraft’s time-to-go calculations.  Finally, the predicted or 




The method by which the precise timing, surveillance data, and wind and air temperature 
estimates are acquired is not provided here.  However, this document provides overall 
requirements for system performance, accuracy, integrity, continuity, and availability of the data. 
 
6.2.2 4D Path Definition 
The path definition function computes the defined 3D path and associated speeds to be flown.  A 
complete 4D path will consist of a number of straight or arc segments in the horizontal plane 
plus altitude and speed specifications as shown in Figure 8.  Each segment ends at a trajectory 
change point (TCP).  The TCPs are assigned by a 4D trajectory generation algorithm which 
attempts to optimize the spacing and merging of the ownship with the assigned reference aircraft.  
A TCP may overlap an existing navigation fix (Area Navigation (RNAV) waypoint, airway fix, 
etc.) but this is not required.  It is, however, anticipated that the trajectory endpoint will coincide 
with a known navigation fix such as the runway threshold or final approach fix (FAF).  Each 
generated trajectory segment or leg will include complete horizontal and vertical navigation 
information as well as a nominal target speed (CAS or Mach) to fly.   
 
 





For each leg of the trajectory, the lateral aspects of path definition determine a geographically 
fixed ground track from origin to destination.  This defines a 2D component of the flight path.  
The sub-functions involved are: 
 
1. TCP location definition in latitude and longitude, or in the case of TCP definitions that do 
not have exact location information, an estimate of the TCP position based on the known 
or predicted state of the aircraft; 
2. Leg type definition as provided in RTCA DO-236B and ARINC 424; 
3. Leg transition definition which specifies turning to the next leg prior to intercepting the 
waypoint or flying through the waypoint prior to turning, etc.; 
 
For each leg of the trajectory, the vertical aspect of the path definition determines an elevation 
change from the TCP at the beginning of the leg to the TCP at the end of the leg.  This adds the 
3rd dimension to the defined flight path.  The vertical aspect sub-functions are: 
 
1. Altitude or flight level constraints associated with waypoint definition; (Flight Level, 
corrected barometric altitude, temperature compensated altitude, or height above ellipsoid 
for GPS based precision approach)  
2. Optional vertical angle or altitude change associated with the leg definition and vertical 
transition definition which specifies how the leg should be flown.  For example, climb 
and hold or follow a glideslope; 
3. Optional speed constraint; 
 
The temporal aspects of the path definition determine the method used to satisfy time constraints 
associated with either the precision separation requirement or time of arrival constraint at the 
destination waypoint.  The time constraints must take into account the lateral and vertical 
trajectory, the flight environment, and real-time parameters provided by the ANSP and the 
assigned reference aircraft.  This is accomplished through speed control which controls the 
fourth dimension (time) for the flight path.  The temporal aspect sub-functions are: 
 
1. Nominal interval management time; 
2. Optional speed constraint; 
 
6.2.3 Speed Control 
The speed control function uses the planned 4D trajectories of both the ownship and the lead 
aircraft along with current measured positions and velocities of both the ownship and the 
reference aircraft, latest wind estimates, and other associated parameters to determine the along-
path range to the spacing point, speed variation, and target speed command.  These parameters 
are used to correct errors and interval variations relative to the reference aircraft.  The lateral and 
vertical steering functions are defined in RTCA DO-236B [3] and are omitted from this 
document.  This document instead focuses on the speed control function. 
 
To achieve precise arrival spacing, the navigation system must compute a number of parameters 
for both the ownship and the reference aircraft.  These parameters include the distance along the 
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trajectory from the current estimated position to the interval management point (such as the 
runway threshold or a common merge point), estimated ground speed for each segment of the 
trajectory, and a total TTG to arrive at the interval management point.  These calculations require 
knowledge of the current and predicted states of the ownship and lead aircraft, as well as external 
factors such as the forecast wind and temperatures along the trajectory.  Prior to the start of this 
paired approach, the trajectory generation algorithms generate an optimum profile for both the 
ownship and the reference aircraft.  When executed, these 4D trajectories will ensure achieving 
the desired interval at the interval management point, and will provide an efficient terminal area 
operation (with constraints such as fuel burn, noise abatement, etc.).  Once the aircraft are paired, 
the precision spacing function computes a change in planned speed for the ownship as needed to 
attain the precise spacing interval upon arrival at the interval management point.  The target 
speed will be the sum of the planned trajectory speed at the current location on the trajectory plus 
the required adjustment to account for variations of aircraft states of both the ownship and the 
reference aircraft.  The target speed may be periodically updated as new navigation data and/or 
new constraints become available and as the estimates of the atmospheric parameters change.  
This target speed will be displayed to the flight crew and could also be supplied to the flight 
control system for possible automated speed control operations.  
 
The accuracy of TTG prediction for interval control purposes will depend upon the accuracy of 
the parameters input or calculated, the control system accuracy, external factors such as winds, 
and the aircraft performance (including operating limits).  As the reference aircraft approaches 
the interval management point, the accuracy of the TTG prediction will increase.  The aircraft 
performance limitations such as speed and angle of attack limits will become the primary 
constraint on achieving the required spacing time without altering the flight path. 
 
6.2.4 User Interface 
6.2.4.1 Controls, Displays, and System Alerting 
The user interface is achieved through system controls, displays, and alerting functions.  These 
functions provide the means for system initialization, 4D trajectory generation and progress 
monitoring, active speed control and presentation of spacing time data for flight crew situational 




The aircraft’s instantaneous position and velocity must be reported via a digital data link (ADS-
B).  Depending on the required level of RIMP, other critical parameters may be required in the 
data link such as the planned 4D trajectory currently being flown by the aircraft. 
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6.3 Required Interval Management Performance  
6.3.1 Time Navigation 
The NextGen TBO environment is expected to include precise time-based operations where 
aircraft will be required to arrive at a point at a specified time.  This time may be a fixed time of 
arrival or a time relative to the arrival time of the reference aircraft.  The first type of time 
operation is referred to as Time of Arrival Control (TOAC), while the second is referred to as 
relative time spacing. 
 
In addition to time computation and control accuracy, there is also a need to provide a level of 
confidence in which aircraft can perform time operations at the geographic fixes in a TBO 
environment.   
 
6.3.2 RIMP Concept 
The concept of time performance has not been defined by the ICAO in the same manner as RNP, 
and the Minimum Aviation System Performance Specification (MASPS) addresses accuracy 
requirements of ETA and TOAC at only a very high level.  Because of the perceived importance 
of time-based operations in the NextGen Air Traffic Management (ATM) environment, this 
document develops a proposed RIMP construct and associated requirements. 
 
For consistency with the ICAO definition of RNP, this document defines RIMP as: A statement 
of the time navigation performance accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability necessary for 
time interval management operations within a defined airspace. 
 
6.3.3 Application of RIMP 
The term RIMP is applied as a descriptor for operations that can be part of airspaces, routes, and 
procedures.  Unlike RNP, the descriptor is only applied to each instance where RIMP is required 
and not the entire airspace, since interval management is done on an operation-by-operation 
basis.  This concept, however, could eventually be applied to the entire airspace. 
 
6.3.4 RIMP Types 
The term RIMP-x-y is introduced to denote RIMP operations. 
 
The x indicates the type of RIMP operation 
A – Absolute Time 
R – Relative Time (ASAS Spacing) 
O – Open Loop (Time prediction only, no time control). 
 
Note: The open loop is a place holder in anticipation of future changes to DO-236B [2].  
Additional types of operations may be defined in the future as well.  One such operation could be 




The y indicates the limit of RIMP accuracy in seconds (e.g. RIMP-A-10 indicates absolute time 
control with 10 seconds required accuracy).  There is a correlation between the type and 
accuracy where the Open Loop type can only achieve a low accuracy.  The RIMP accuracy for 
open loop is expressed in % of TTG as it is expected to only be used for pairings where ownship 
and the reference aircraft are further out. 
 
6.4 Assumptions 
The APS concept of operations relies on the premise that by knowing both the ownship and the 
reference aircraft’s 4D trajectories and the aircraft position along that 4D trajectory, it is possible 
to determine the ownship and the reference aircraft’s Time-To-Go to a given point on their 
individual trajectories.  Therefore, it is necessary to define a means of acquiring the aircraft 
planned trajectory and position on that trajectory, and define an assumptions-based predictive 
model for the computation of a 4D trajectory and Time-To-Go.   
 
6.4.1 Reference Aircraft State 
The RIMP concept assumes that all aircraft in the airspace continuously transmit and receive 
ADS-B data in compliance with RTCA DO-242A including the following parameters: 
 Target identity 
 Latitude and longitude 
 Pressure altitude 
 Position accuracy and integrity 
 North and east velocity 
 Vertical speed 
 Velocity accuracy and integrity 
 Time of applicability (reference time of the other state parameters) 
It is further assumed that ownship and reference are either using the same transmission format 
for ADS-B (e.g. 1090ES or UAT) or the airspace is served by an Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance – Rebroadcast (ADS-R) service that reliably echoes messages between the two 
transmission formats with negligible delay. 
 
6.4.2 Ownship State 
The spacing function has access to at least the set of ownship state parameters that is available 
via ADS-B for the reference aircraft. 
 
6.4.3 Reference Aircraft Intent 
The APS concept assumes that the aircraft has knowledge of the reference aircraft lateral, 
vertical, and speed profile. There are many possible mechanisms for acquiring an aircraft 
trajectory ranging from assuming that the reference aircraft will adhere to a published augmented 
Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR) with the augmentation in the form of altitude or speed 
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crossing restrictions at waypoints on the route, to the acquisition in real time of a Flight 
Management System (FMS) profile being broadcast by the reference aircraft.  The method used 
is a determinant factor in quantifying the level of accuracy and integrity of the trajectory. 
 
Regardless of the method used, the RIMP level of performance will be a function of: 
1. The errors and uncertainty in the reference aircraft actual lateral, vertical and speed 
profile flown versus its published profile.  The Reference aircraft is assumed to be RNP 
compliant in that its lateral and vertical deviation from the published profile is bounded 
by the profile’s published RNP accuracy and integrity figures of merit. 
2. The errors and uncertainties in the true wind field and temperature profile versus the 
forecast.  It is assumed that ownship has access to a forecast wind field and temperature 
profile applicable to both the ownship and the reference aircraft. 
 
6.4.4 Ownship Intent 
The RIMP concept assumes access to detailed and accurate ownship intent information and 
associated accuracy metrics from the onboard FMS or an equivalent system.  Ownship is 
assumed to be operating at a specified RNP level. 
 
6.5 Definitions 
This section defines key terms that are used throughout this document. 
6.5.1 Required Interval Management Performance 
REQUIRED INTERVAL MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE (RIMP) 
A statement of the performance accuracy of an in-trail paired interval management operation 
between two aircraft. 
 
PAIRED INTERVAL MANAGEMENT 
An operation where a trailing aircraft is required to arrive at a waypoint a specified time period 
after a specified reference aircraft arrives at that same waypoint. 
 
OWNSHIP 
The trailing aircraft which is controlling the interval in a paired interval management operation. 
 
REFERENCE AIRCRAFT 









A predetermined geographical position used for route definition and/or progress reporting 
purposes that is defined by latitude and longitude [2]. 
 
TIME REFERENCE 
The reference time source for the trajectory; for example, Universal Coordinated Time (UTC). 
 
CURRENT TIME 
The present time according to the time reference. 
 
PREDICTED TRAJECTORY 
The predicted 3D position of an aircraft as a function of time. 
 
ESTIMATED TIME 
The time input to the trajectory prediction function, synchronized to the time reference. 
 
ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL (ETA) 
The time at which an aircraft will arrive at a defined point on the predicted trajectory. 
 
ESTIMATED TIME TO GO (ETTG) 
The predicted duration from the current time until the aircraft reaches a defined point. 
 
TIME TO GO (TTG) 
The duration from the current time until the aircraft reaches a defined point, typically in this 
discussion, the Interval Management Point. 
 
TRAJECTORY CHANGE POINT (TCP) 
A discrete point on the predicted trajectory containing the latitude, longitude, altitude, time, and 
speed (either CAS or Mach).  This is a basic set of variables that may be standardized and/or 
expanded in the future. 
 
INTERVAL MANAGEMENT POINT 
A defined waypoint on the predicted trajectory at which the specified interval between ownship 
and the reference aircraft is defined.   
 
6.5.3 Error Terms 
6.5.3.1 Along-Track 
This document considers only along-track error.  Cross-Track and Vertical errors are considered 





Figure 9 - Along Track Components of Navigation Error Terms  
 
ESTIMATED TIME ERROR (ETE) 
The difference between the current time and the estimated time, synchronized to the time 
reference. 
 
ESTIMATED POSITION ERROR (EPE) 
The arrival time error due to difference between the true position and the estimated position 
along the current heading of the aircraft, expressed in seconds. 
 
TIME TO GO ERROR (TTGE) 
The difference between the true time to go and the estimated time to go. 
 
ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL ERROR (ETAE) 
The difference between the true time of arrival and the estimated time of arrival at a point.  This 
is equal to the vector sum of the estimated time error, estimated position error, and time to go 
error. 
 
6.5.3.2 Interval Management Performance 
There are errors associated with a paired interval management operation which must be 
considered in the Required Interval Management Performance. 
 
DESIRED SPACING 
The required time interval, in seconds, between Ownship and Reference Aircraft at the Interval 























The time interval, in seconds, between Ownship and Reference Aircraft at the Interval 
Management Point that is input to the spacing computation function.   
 
ESTIMATED SPACING 
The output of the spacing computation function, equal to the difference between Reference 
Aircraft’s estimated time of arrival and ownship’s estimated time of arrival at the interval 
management point.  This does not take into account potential future speed changes prior to the 
interval management point that are not reflected in the predicted trajectory. 
 
ESTIMATED TIME BIAS (ETB) 
The portion of the estimated time of arrival error that will be identical between ownship and 
reference aircraft (for example due to a shared wind error along a common path segment). 
 
SPACING DEFINITION ERROR (SDE) 
The difference between the desired spacing and the defined spacing, for example due to a 
difference in resolution between the spacing input and the necessary spacing.16 
 
COMPUTED SPACING ERROR (CSE) 
The difference between the estimated spacing and the defined spacing. 
 
SPACING ESTIMATION ERROR (SEE) 
The error in the computation of estimated spacing.  This is equal to the sum of the estimated time 
of arrival error for both ownship and reference aircraft minus any estimated time bias. 
 
SPACING CONTROL AUTHORITY (SCA) 
The ability of ownship to maneuver in order to compensate for computed spacing error and 
spacing estimate error. 
 
TOTAL SPACING ERROR (TSE) 
The difference between the true spacing and the desired spacing.  Until ownship has reached the 
interval management point, TSE can only be estimated based on a prediction of owship time to 
go, either reference time to go or measurement of reference IMP crossing time, and estimated 
spacing control authority.  It is equal to the sum of the spacing definition error, computed 
spacing error, and spacing estimation error less the spacing control authority.  The spacing 
control authority is subtracted because it represents a controllable portion of the error.  The 
uncontrollable portion of the error is analogous to the Flight Technical Error (FTE) in RNP. 
 
Since the spacing estimation error has to rely on a probabilistic prediction, there may be a need 
for future control actions to correct for “true” disturbances and errors that were not part of the 
prediction.  Figure 10 also shows how the uncertainty of the predicted time grows the farther 
from ownship the spacing point is located. 
 
                                                 
16 For example, if the desired spacing specified by ATC is in seconds but the defined spacing that is input into the 





Figure 10 - Reference Time Profile with Uncertainty 
 
6.5.3.3 Along Track Containment Concept 
The concept of along-track containment must be coupled with the concept of lateral (or cross-
track) containment as defined in RTCA DO-236B.  If a desired lateral path exists, the Cross-
Track Containment Limit combined with the Along-Track Containment Limit defines a region 
around the desired location of the aircraft at a defined future time T.  The probability that the 
aircraft will be within that region in both the cross-track and along-track domains at time T, can 
be bounded.  This time T may be a fixed time, or it may be an offset time relative to another 
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Figure 11 - Along-Track and Cross-Track Containment Region 
 
Along-Track containment integrity requirements limit the probability of the Total Spacing 
Error exceeding the Along-Track Performance requirements with no annunciation at least some 
specified time before the defined time T.   
 
Along-Track containment continuity requirements limit the probability of a loss of function.  In 
this context, function is defined as the ability of the APS system to meet the along track 
containment requirement (i.e. to be within the desired containment limit at time T). 
 
There are five possible system states relative to along-track containment limit, C.  These states 
are: 
6) S1: TSE Error > C, TTG > ∆T, no alert (Integrity) 
7) S2: TSE Error > C, TTG > ∆T, alert  (Continuity) 
8) S3: TSE Error > C, TTG < ∆T, no alert (Integrity) 
9) S4: TSE Error > C, TTG < ∆T, alert  (Continuity) 
10) S5: TSE Error < C, no alert   (Normal Operations) 
 
Note: P(S1) + P(S2) + P(S3) + P(S4) + P(S5) = 1 where P(x) is the probability of the system 
being in State x. 
 
∆T is the minimum amount of time prior to reaching the Interval Management Point that the alert 
must be made if the aircraft cannot achieve the required spacing time. 
 
States 1 and 3 represent the set of events associated with a loss of along-track performance with 
no annunciation (alert), and are thus the integrity requirements.  The uncertainties associated 
with time predictions generally increase with distance from the current trajectory point (primarily 
due to forecast wind uncertainties).  Therefore, the probability that the along-track performance 
cannot be achieved will generally decrease with distance to the Interval Management Point.  
Thus, the probability of State 1 will be greater than the probability of State 3 (P(S1) >> P(S3)) 


















ownship has to correct for these uncertainties will also generally decrease as the aircraft 
approaches the Interval Management Point.  This needs to be considered when determining a 
time T beyond which it is critical that an annunciation be received.  Thus, the probability of S1 
must be less than XX17 per flight hour, while the probability of S3 must be less than YY per 
operation. 
 
The continuity requirement applies to states S2 and S4 where the loss of function is detected 
and annunciated.  When current time is still far before T (TTG > ∆T), the available control 
authority will be larger, and thus the probability of state S2 must be less than WW per flight 
hour.  When the aircraft is close to time T the control authority is greatly reduced, and thus the 
probability of S4 must be less than ZZ per flight hour.  S5 represents the normal operation where 
the error is less than the containment limit. 
 
In addition to the containment requirements, there is an uncertainty parameter associated with 
the predicted ETA at various points on the predicted trajectory.  This uncertainty must be 
bounded to ensure appropriate control authority is available. 
 
CONTAINMENT 
A set of interrelated parameters used to define the performance of a time control system.  These 
parameters are containment integrity, containment continuity, and containment region. 
 
CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 
A measure of confidence in the estimate, expressed as the probability that the system will detect 
and annunciate the condition where the TSE is greater than the along-track containment limit and 
the condition has not been detected.   
 
CONTAINMENT CONTINUITY 
The capability of the total system to satisfy the performance limit without nonscheduled 
interruptions during the intended operation.  Nonscheduled interruption is defined to be either 1) 
total loss of  time prediction capability; 2) a failure of the system which is annunciated as a loss 
of time performance capability; or 3) a false annunciation of loss of time performance capability. 
 
CONTAINMENT REGION 
A region in both the along-track and cross-track dimensions, centered on the desired along track 
position on the desired path at a desired time T, to which the containment integrity and 
containment continuity are referenced.   
 
CROSS-TRACK CONTAINMENT LIMIT 
As defined in DO-236B MASPS. 
 
                                                 
17 This and the following probability parameters will need to be determined based on a TLS and any mitigations 
that are identified as part of the procedures defined by the ANSP.  In practice, they will likely be tailored to specific 
RIMP performance categories. 
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ALONG-TRACK CONTAINMENT LIMIT 
A time that defines the one-dimensional containment limit in the along-track dimension.  The 
resulting containment region is centered on desired along-track position at desired time T and is 
bounded by +/- the along-track containment limit in the along-track dimension. 
 
ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL UNCERTAINTY 
A measure based on a defined scale in seconds which conveys the performance of the estimated 
time of arrival at the center of that containment region. 
 
This measure is required because a type of integrity performance measure is needed.  It is based 
on a defined scale (e.g. 95%). 
 
The containment region is bound around ETA where the actual time of arrival will be within the 
ETA uncertainty in seconds. 
 
The RNP-equivalent for the ETA uncertainty is the Estimated Position Uncertainty. 
 
6.6 System Performance Requirements 
6.6.1 Accuracy 
A measure of the difference between an aircraft‘s reported planned interval, i.e. ADS-B report, 
as compared to its achieved interval.  It is given by a number bounded by a confidence value.  
For example; within the RIMP-R-10 interval management operation the Total Spacing Error 
cannot be greater than 10.0 seconds 95% of the time. 
 
6.6.2 Integrity 
The probability that information provided by a system will not be hazardously misleading. It is 
generally a number, per operating hour, which expresses likelihood that a system will send the 
user bad/incorrect information that could cause a potentially dangerous situation without a timely 
warning.  For example; the likelihood that a Total Spacing Error exceeds a maximum of 10.0 
seconds containment, without detection, shall be less than 10-5 per flight hour. 
 
6.6.3 Continuity 
The capability of a total system to perform its intended function without a non-scheduled 
interruption during the intended operation assuming the system was available when the 
procedure was initiated.  Continuity is expressed per unit of time.  For example; the calculations 





The probability that a system will perform its required function at the initiation of the intended 





From the outset, this effort planned to use the existing RNP concept as a baseline for extending 
the construct to encompass several operations involving constraints that are not fixed relative to 
the Earth’s surface (‘static’ RNP) but rather are relative to the position of other aircraft 
(‘dynamic’ RNP).  Basing these dynamic RNP constructs on the existing RNP formulation 
provided a useful starting point and encouraged casting the problems in generally recognized 
terms, such as TLS and containment.   
 
An attempt was made to follow the RNP MASPS as a template to document these concepts.  The 
MASPS document outline was adequate for capturing, explaining, and organizing requirements, 
but it was not well suited to the task of providing a clear description and analysis of new and 
unfamiliar air traffic management concepts. Initially, the study team sought a unified construct 
capable of encompassing a wide range of multi-vehicle operations, but the team was unable to 
formulate such a generic construct for defining containment and integrity without defining the 
nature of the operation.  Therefore, the study was refocused on two specific types of two-vehicle 
operation: RSSP and RIMP. 
 
The extension of the static RNP construct to the 4D dynamic operations described in the 
preceeding sections uncovered a number of complications.  The first difficulty was the lack of 
well developed existing constructs for vertical and longitudinal RNP.  Though the existing RNP 
standards include vertical and longitudinal performance measures, they do not contain fully 
developed constructs for containment and integrity as has been developed for the lateral case.  At 
a minimum, the longitudinal construct was required for both operations examined in this work.  
To complete the RSSP construct, a detailed vertical construct will be required.  While extending 
the lateral containment and integrity constructs to the longitudinal dimension was difficult, the 
issues associated with defining a performance standard based on the interaction of two 
independent vehicles further compounded the problem.  Finally, extending the analysis beyond 
the present state of the vehicle to encompass key metrics that exist only as predicted future 
quantities added another layer of complexity.  Trying to properly account for external (not 
intrinsic to the aircraft system) error sources, such as the impact of unquantified wind 
prediction/estimation errors on trajectory predictions, proved particularly elusive. 
 
Trying to define generic constructs not coupled to a specific set of procedures and algorithms led 
to unresolved issues for both constructs examined.  Some aspects of the self-separation 
performance were found to depend on how and when trajectory adjustments are made (e.g. a few 
discrete maneuvers vs. continuous adjustment).  Similarly for the spacing problem, the spacing 
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performance was found to likely depend on the tuning of the speed adjustment algorithm (e.g., 
whether predicted errors are nulled early or late; whether speed changes are continuous or 
discrete).  Issues also arose as to how mixed-equipage operations would be addressed in a 
performance standard, as well as transitions into and out of self-separation and interval-
management operations.  
7.2 Next Steps 
Before the level of safety can be analyzed for either type of operation, each construct needs to 
have a detailed ConOps developed.  The ConOps would include procedures, operational 
constraints, and mitigation strategies for non-normal conditions. 
 
The complete RSSP concept needs to address the vertical dimension.  The containment construct 
for RSSP should capture the nonlinearities of the problem and address non-circular exclusion 
zones.  The safety case for RSSP will require a much deeper understanding of the impact of 
traffic density/complexity and trajectory predictability and stability on the achieved level of 
safety.  Extensive Monte Carlo testing will be required to generate a quantatative understanding 
of these factors.  Extension of RSSP concepts to constraints other than air vehicles (e.g. weather 
cells, prohibited airspace, volcanic ash clouds, etc.) is expected to be relatively straightforward. 
 
For the RIMP construct, one or more representative interval management algorithms (including 
both ETA prediction and speed profile management) need to be employed to permit quantatative 
analysis of performance.  The  authors have determined that such analysis can only be performed 
using simulation-based techniques.  A basic capability has been constructed using a simple 
interval control algorithm.  Further development by this team will refine the control algorithm 
and allow for introducing wind, sensor, time-to-go prediction, and aircraft performance model 
errors into that algorithm.  This version of the RIMP simulation model will also be capable of 
supporting Monte Carlo simulation studies.  The model should eventually be extended to permit 
simulation of sequences of self-spacing aircraft so that the dynamics of the chain using various 
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4D 4 Dimensional 
A/C Aircraft 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast 
ADS-R Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Rebroadcast 
ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider 
APS Airborne Precision Spacing 
ASAS Airborne Separation Asssurance/Assistance System 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
ATS Air Traffic Services 
CAS Calibrated Air Speed 
CNS Communication, Navigation, Surveillance 
ConOps Concept of Operations 
CSE Computed Spacing Error 
DOF Degrees Of Freedom 
EPE Estimated Position Error 
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival 
ETAE Estimated Time Of Arrival Error 
ETB Estimated Time Bias 
ETE Estimated Time Error 
ETTG Estimated Time To Go 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAF Final Approach Fix 
FIS-B Flight Information Service - Broadcast 
FMS Flight Management System 
FTE Flight Technical Error 
GNSS Global Navigation Surveillance System 
GPS Global Positioning System 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
INS Inertial Navigation System 
JPDO Joint Planning and Development Office 
MASPS Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards 
NAS National  Airspace System 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
PCA Point of Closest Approach 
RIMP Required Interval Management Performance 
RNAV Area Navigation 
RNP Required Navigation Performance 
RSSP Required Self Separation Performance 
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
SBL Separation Boundary Lateral 
SBV Separation Boundary Vertical 
SCA Spacing Control Authority 
SDE Spacing Definition Error 
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SEE Spacing Estimation Error 
SM Separation Management 
STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Route  
TBO Trajectory Based Operation 
TCP Trajectory Change Point 
TIS-B Traffic Information Service - Broadcast 
TLS Target Level of Safety 
TOAC Time Of Arrival Control 
TSE Total Spacing Error 
TTG Time To Go 
TTGE Time To Go Error 
UAT Universal Access Transceiver  
UTC Universal Coordinated Time 
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